immigrant population is mixed – that is, compris-
es both economic migrants and persons in need
of protection.”
Which is the main problem caused by Dublin ΙΙ?
In June 2013 the Dublin II treaty was recast; how-
ever Greece, Malta and certain Italian MEPs
voted against it.
As stressed by Dr. Dimitriadis, “the recast mech-
anism shall come into force on July 21, 2015,
along with the recast Reception Conditions
Directive and the recast Asylum Procedures
Directive. The recast Qualifications Directive comes
into force in December 2013. Together with EURO-
DAC, they comprise the well-known CEAS, which is
now being implemented gradually, until it is finally
ratified by the Parliaments of the EU member
states.”
The main problem with Dublin II was, and still is,
that it transfers the burden to the external borders
of the EU, in other words to the countries of the
South, which are the first point of entry.
The rationale of the recast directive is that it pre-
serves the initial rule of return to the country of
entry, extending, at the same time, the mandate of
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO),
which is now in charge of supervising the early
warning and crisis management mechanism. The
purpose of this mechanism is to assess the oper-
ation of national asylum systems in practice, to
provide assistance to struggling member states
and to prevent asylum crises. It is a positive step
towards the right direction, but, in practice, it does
not change the role of Dublin II, which remains an
uneven and, to a great extent, unjust system for
dealing with irregular arrivals,” says Dr. Dimitriadis.
Which measures could Greece promote dur-
ing the EU presidency, in order to achieve a
comprehensive migration policy?
Greece, which is currently going through an
unprecedented economic crisis, needs, as do
other countries of the European South, financial
support in order to sufficiently handle migration
flows. It also suffers from the lack of infrastructure
(e.g. detention centres, centres for hosting unac-
companied minors), properly trained personnel,
as well as equipment.
Moreover, as noted by Dr. Dimitriadis, Greece
must apply new pressures for the full implemen-
tation of the redistribution clause, which will pro-
vide for the relocation of asylum seekers within
the EU, depending on each country’s GDP, struc-
ture and distinguishing characteristics. In this
effort Greece may find support from Malta, Italy
and maybe Spain. It is a matter of fact that a few
countries are currently bearing the brunt of han-
dling the issue: some Central and North
European countries that receive large number of
asylum applications, but also have high asylum
seeker recognition rates (Germany, Sweden,
Austria, Norway) and countries that are points of
entry (Greece, Malta, Italy and now Bulgaria).
Therefore, there is no equal sharing of the burden
in the EU-28.”
According to Dr. Dimitriadis, “we are given a
chance to shift the debate towards the creation of
legal migration opportunities. Even if arrivals to
Greece stopped tomorrow, inflows would
increase at other points throughout the EU – the
problem remains a European one, and concerns
both us and the other partners. Therefore, the
debate should be focused on the needs that we
have as Europe, on where and how we can cover
them by offering opportunities to third country cit-
izens within a framework that protects human
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