It is well-known that Greece proved to be the
weakest link of the European Union and the first
country to succumb to the global crisis.
Consequently, it became the laboratory for testing
measures and policies that had never been
implemented before, in a euro zone that was
caught unprepared, as if the international crisis
would never affect it.
The imposition of absolute austerity as a salva-
tion measure has led to the vicious spiral of long-
term recession that opposes recovery.
Structural reform, which is undoubtedly neces-
sary, does not bear fruit immediately, but in the
medium to long term; while it is further impeded
by a fractured social environment that is in a crit-
ical condition.
The perception, prevailing in many European
countries, that the crisis was only Greece's con-
cern, proved to be wrong when the crisis spread
in other countries of the South, while now it
seems to move north, either in the form of debts
and deficits, or in the form of a downturn.
The discussion under this section should concern
very specific options, such as:
●The reduction of bilateral debts between
European states, in a way that creates some
hope of sustainability.
●The increase of exports from crisis-stricken
countries with a parallel increase of consump-
tion in the other countries.
●Setting debt repayments to a specific percent-
age of the export revenues of the debtor coun-
try (it was decided that Germany would pay
less of 1/20 of its export revenues), a measure
with multiplying effects.
●The financing of a major European programme
of investment in networks (railways, roads, tele-
coms, innovation) by the ECB and the
European Investment Bank. This measure
would create the necessary development infra-
structures, as well as jobs, and would trigger a
change of course for the corresponding
economies.
●Europe's energy policy, through long-term plan-
ning that incorporates the prominent roles of
Greece and Cyprus, as an issue included in the
overall change in European policy.
●The integration of the banking system through
the guarantee of deposits and a new role for the
European Central Bank, which should start
making strong liquidity injections or printing
money, in one way or another.
The Nymfaio Conference
Is this an ambitious plan? Obviously. That said,
these times require leaders who can see far and
aim high.
We have the power, the historical experience and,
above all, the need to try to formulate an alternative
policy, capable of determining, or altering, the agen-
da of the Summits, even that of May (remember
that the European Council of 2010 was particularly
influenced by the academic report of the “Bocconi
Boys”, Alesina-Ardagna, which advocated fiscal
austerity, claiming that it is a prerequisite for growth
and the only way out of a crisis).
Why can't we, based on the experience of a failed
three-year European undertaking, produce an aca-
demic counterweight to the failed scientific
approach of “expansionary austerity”.
So, I will name this conference the “Nymfaio
Conference”, from the small town of Northern
Greece that was burned to the ground, abandoned,
and now is again a gem of beauty and a prime
example of economic growth.
And all this happened because, in hard times,
local leaders dreamt, planned, dared and, above
all, agreed.
Trade with Greece
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