•
generate growth.
We need both. We cannot make the difference
with only one of the two…
•
We need to kill the structural problems of our
fiscal sector and simultaneously fight the ensu-
ing recession; otherwise we will sink deeper
into recession and our fiscal deficits will remain
stubbornly high, despite our painful efforts;
•
we need to simultaneously fight the deficit and
the Debt.
We need direct cuts to our outstanding Debt; oth-
erwise the total Debt will rise and we will end up
with higher future deficits due to increased inter-
est payments.
Only if we attack the deficit-debt dynamics “from
all fronts” at the same time, will we be able to
reverse the trend in a sustainable manner.
And this is exactly what we intend to do.
The idle property of the Public Sector is the key to
direct Debt reduction. This goes far beyond the
typical privatization of Public Companies.
It includes modern Real Estate Development proj-
ects through leasing, long term leasing, Real
Estate Mutual Funds and Real Estate Holding
Companies.
All in all, our long term strategy needs one final
ingredient: a positive shock to unleash our great
productive potential.
What are the ingredients of such a potential?
•
Huge idle property resources;
•
immense unexploited competitive advantages;
•
and a Greek people awakening with the
resolve to change everything and reset their
economy on a growth path; albeit on sound
economic fundamentals this time around…
A lot remains to be done: starting with the estab-
lishment of a favorable business climate of low
taxes, low costs, zero tolerance to bureaucracy
and public sector fraud.
Greece is a unique case of a potentially rich econ-
omy that almost went bankrupt.
This paradox will change soon.
The Greek Economy has turned the tables, time
and again in the past.
It will do the same once more.
The only difference being that this time we will
take all precautions not to find ourselves again in
the same desperate position.
•
After 1974, Greece established a stable parlia-
mentary democracy. This remarkable achieve-
ment was made possible at a considerable
cost: an unsustainable level of public sector
deficits and debt accumulation.
•
After the year 2000, Greece joined the euro-
zone. This was achieved at a high cost of
diminishing competitiveness. It wasn’t the euro
that harmed us; it was the reluctance of our
political system to go ahead with all the neces-
sary structural changes.
•
After 2010, we will preserve all past achieve-
ments and remedy our flows.
We shall overcome our current problems.
Greece will soon emerge as a “Mediterranean
Tiger”.
And all those who contributed to such a spectac-
ular transformation will be the shareholders of a
major Hellenic success.
Trade with Greece
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