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they had been pointing out to political leaderships
what that the latter had been refusing to stare in
the face. Namely, that they should be staying
ahead of developments, and not the other way
around.
Before moving on, it is worth mentioning some
landmark –as far as the resolution of the Greek
debt crisis is concerned– statements:
Friday, December 11, 2009:
The then Prime
Minister of Greece, George Papandreou, stated
in Brussels that, according to Messrs. Jean-
Claude Trichet and Jean-Claude Juncker, there
was no possibility of a Greek default.
Friday, January 29, 2010:
Monetary Affairs
Commissioner Joaquin Almunia, stated that there
was no bailout and no “plan B” for the Greek
economy because there was no risk it would
default on its debt.
Thursday, September 16, 2010:
“Restructuring
M
any people often say that numbers do
not always tell the truth. That cold sta-
tistics conceal unseen truths. Are they
right? They might be.
As a matter of fact, the debt crisis we have been
facing in the past three years is unprecedented
and, therefore, very difficult for all of us to under-
stand. Having experienced the crisis for quite
some time now, we can more or less rely on the
statements of political officials in order to antici-
pate its next stage. Simply put, the statements of
all European officials that were involved in the cri-
sis provide the best economic indicator for pre-
dicting its course.
In the case of the Euro zone, the problem is that
apparently these officials had not –and still
haven't– realized the criticality of the situation, or
how it should be handled.
In such a climate, it is no coincidence that their
decisions –beginning with the decision reached
on July 21st, 2011– were frowned upon by the
markets, which were in the end vindicated, since
Trade with Greece
32
PSI:
when politics
take the place of
economics
The day after the Greek haircut. Consequences,
concerns and the impact on politics.
By Nectarios V. Notis